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本文译自 Marnie Hughes‑Warrington 所著 Fifty Key Thinkers on History（Routledge，2014 年第三版）一书中关于黑格尔的词条。
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黑格尔（1770–1831）

对格奥尔格·威廉·弗里德里希·黑格尔而言，哲学是“被提升到思想高度的它自己的时代”。这句简短的话传达了黑格尔著作中的核心理念：哲学的普遍性与历史的特殊性彼此相属，二者之间产生的张力会引发新的观念和人类经验。此外，在黑格尔那里，这种关系的开放性本质也解释了为什么他的作品会被不同的读者以极为不同的方式看待。一些人否定他，理由是认为他将历史束缚于一种西方哲学观；另一些人则称赞他将历史维度引入哲学。然而，这两类读者都同意，仅凭黑格尔对十九世纪和二十世纪思想的影响，就足以说明理解他的论述为何重要。

黑格尔于1770年8月27日出生在斯图加特。他在图宾根学习神学，并与诗人弗里德里希·荷尔德林及哲学家谢林结为好友。在伯尔尼和法兰克福担任家庭教师之后，黑格尔在耶拿大学先后任讲师和教授。他完成了第一部著作《科学体系：第一部分，精神现象学》（1807年，英译名为《精神现象学》），完稿时正值拿破仑入侵耶拿前夕。拿破仑军队占领耶拿导致大学关闭，黑格尔被迫离开。他先是在班贝格担任一家报纸的编辑（1808年），随后在纽伦堡的一所学校担任校长兼哲学教师（1808–1816）。在此期间，他完成了《逻辑学》（1812–1816，英译名为《逻辑学》）。1816年，他担任海德堡大学哲学教授，1818年又受聘担任柏林大学享有盛誉的哲学教授。在海德堡期间，他出版了《哲学科学百科全书纲要》（1817年，部分英译名为《逻辑学百科全书》、《自然哲学》和《主观精神哲学》）。在柏林，黑格尔扩充并修订了《主观精神哲学》，以《自然法与政治学纲要——法哲学原理》（1821年，英译名为《法哲学原理》）为书名出版。直到1831年因霍乱去世，他一直在柏林大学任教，并出版了《百科全书》的修订版（1827年和1830年）。他去世后，其关于历史哲学、哲学史、宗教哲学和美学的多部讲演录得以出版。

对黑格尔而言，每一位历史学家，即便是声称让“事实自己说话”的历史学家，也带着自己的范畴，并透过这些范畴来看材料。在一切被认为科学的事物中，理性必须保持清醒，并且必须运用反思。（《历史哲学讲演录》，第11页，以下简称《历史哲学》）有些范畴优于其他范畴，而那些声称自己只是被动接受的历史学家，则容易接纳糟糕的观念或谬误。在《历史哲学》的导论中，黑格尔详细阐述了他所看到的历史研究中寻求更充分范畴的历史。这段历史有三个阶段——原始的、批判的和哲学的——可以视为一个形式等级体系。等级体系中的每一种形式都体现了历史的理念，但更高的形式体现得更为完整。每一种形式都是历史理念在某一特定阶段的顶点；也就是说，在它被揭示为不充分之前，每一种形式都被认为代表了历史理念的最佳体现。当那种不充分性暴露出来时，历史学家就被迫采用一种新的历史理念。

根据黑格尔，原始历史学家“主要描述他们眼前的行为、事件和状况，并且他们与这些行为、事件和状况共享精神”（《历史哲学》，第1–3页）。因此，原始历史从历史学家的视角描述当代或近当代的事件。黑格尔认为，这种历史观可以在希罗多德和修昔底德的著作中看到。这种历史观不再是主流，因为历史学家意识到他们自己的观点与他们所写的人们的观点可能并不一致；历史学家也不把自己局限于描述近期事件。黑格尔告诉我们，原始历史观让位于普遍历史观。普遍历史学家提供对一个民族、一个国家乃至整个世界历史的概览。有两个问题困扰着他们。第一，他们发现很难为限制自己著作的范围提供正当理由。也就是说，历史学家有什么依据来证明将自己的叙述限定于特定的时间、民族或地点是合理的？第二，他们受到如何公正对待不同于自己观点的其他观点这一问题的困扰。他们是在把握其他时代的精神，还是仅仅利用历史材料来表达自己的观点？黑格尔认为，在回应这些关切时，普遍历史学家通常最终写出实用主义的历史、批判的历史或片段的历史。批判历史学家将其研究限定于曾塑造过去历史书写的那些观念。片段历史学家也对观念感兴趣，但他们旨在超越“一个民族的偶然特殊性、纯粹外在的关系”，达到“事件和行动的内在指导灵魂”（《历史哲学》，第8页）；也就是说，他们试图确认是什么引导一个民族的历史。对黑格尔而言，艺术史、宗教史和法史可能提供关于是什么引导一个民族发展的线索，但只有哲学，由于意识到自身的方法以及艺术、宗教和法的方法，才能把历史的引导力量明确地揭示出来。

黑格尔告诉我们，哲学历史学家认识到，表面上各自独立的历史观念和事件都同属一个现实，即“精神”（Mind/Spirit），而这个精神正在寻求统一和实现。精神是普遍的，不能等同于任何特定个人。相反，每个精神都是这个世界精神（Weltgeist）的一部分，个人理性的发展有助于精神的发展。因此，现实通过理性而生成。要理解现实的发展——并最终理解自身——哲学历史学家就必须对理性的历史进行理性思考（《历史哲学》，第9页）。在黑格尔看来，理性的发展最清晰地体现在自由的发展中。因此，“世界历史无非是自由意识的进步”（同上，第19页）。凭借这些话，黑格尔标示出一个纲领：历史即哲学，哲学即历史；这个纲领许诺的回报是，我们获得关于自身的自我认识，认识到我们正处在地方和全球共同体中成为自由个体的过程之中。

在《历史哲学》的主体部分，黑格尔旨在追溯自由在历史中的展开。他从对“东方世界”的论述开始，这一部分涵盖中国、印度和波斯的早期文明。中国和印度被描述为“停滞的”文明，处于“世界历史之外”或“没有历史”，因为它们已经停止发展（第116页）。世界历史——不同于泛指一切事件而非自由发展的历史——实际上只是在波斯帝国才开始（第173页）。把这些“东方”社会联系在一起的是，法律和道德都是外在规制之事。根据黑格尔，在“东方”个体那里根本不存在形成自己关于对错的道德判断的情况。这种个体道德的缺乏在所考察的三个社会中呈现出不同形式，但它们都产生同样的结果。在中国，政府以皇帝的家长式统治为基础，其他所有人都把自己视为其国家的儿女（第116–138页）。印度的统治力量不是一个人的专制，而是种姓制度的专制，这种制度被视为自然的，因而是不可改变的（第139–166页）。虽然乍看之下波斯皇帝似乎与中国皇帝同类，但波斯帝国的基础可以在一种普遍原则或法律中找到，它同时约束统治者和臣民。黑格尔认为，这是因为波斯是一个以琐罗亚斯德教为基础的神权君主国。虽然波斯远非平等主义，但普遍原则不被视为自然之物这一事实，使发展在原则上成为可能。统治基于理性设计的原则这一观念，标志着自由意识的出现（第187–222页）。在扩张过程中，波斯帝国与斯巴达以及希腊的一些城邦发生了接触。黑格尔援引希罗多德指出，这些群体之间的最终冲突，是一个寻求世界统一于单一领袖之下的专制者，与那些通过集体决定进行统治的各独立城邦之间的较量。¹ 随着希腊人的胜利，自由展开的故事转移到了希腊（第256–257页）。

尽管希腊人比波斯人在更大程度上拥有自由，但黑格尔认为，他们的自由受到两个主要原因的限制。第一，希腊民主制度需要奴隶制才能运作，因为参加公共集会使人没有时间处理日常事务。因此，只有一些人——而非所有人——是自由的。第二，希腊人没有区分自己的个体利益与共同体中他人的利益。在黑格尔看来，由于他们依据社会习俗行动，他们仍然受制于外在控制。例如，真正自由的人不会让自己最重要的决定由神谕来决定：他们会自己作出决定。黑格尔主张，理性把人从外在控制中提升出来，使他们能够批判地反思自己的处境（第258–268页）。黑格尔认为，批判性反思的兴起见于苏格拉底的哲学，苏格拉底揭示出，那些声称知道善或正义等事物本性的人，其实只是在鹦鹉学舌般地重复社会灌输给他们的观念（第269–270页）。鉴于苏格拉底思想的激进性质，黑格尔对他被处死并不感到意外，也认为他的思想扎根下来并成为雅典衰落的最终原因。

随着希腊文明的衰落，罗马文明兴起。希腊人由“习俗道德”凝聚在一起，而罗马人由众多不同民族组成，需要严格的规则来维系自身。虽然在罗马，个体自由的观念并未消失，但它是“抽象的”。如果他人不干涉我想做的事，我就在抽象意义上是自由的。² 在《法哲学原理》中，黑格尔论证说，这并不是一种真正的自由形式，因为它以一种不加批判的方式接受个体的偏好。这些未经质疑的偏好中，有许多不过是社会偏好的回声。因此，在黑格尔看来，抽象自由是一种被他人操纵的自由（《法哲学原理》，第115节）。那种允许人们接纳多样观念和生活方式的真正自由，被罗马政府残酷地压制了。面对国家对外在顺从的要求，个体在斯多葛主义、伊壁鸠鲁主义和怀疑主义中寻求逃避。这些运动旨在使它们的信奉者对世间事务漠不关心。黑格尔认为，遁入这些哲学不过是逃避主义。他主张，为了让自由进一步展开，需要一种积极的回应（《历史哲学》，第278–332页）。

黑格尔认为，基督教提供了那种积极回应。在“宗教自我意识”中，人认识到精神世界才是自己真正的家园。要达到这种意识，人必须打破物质存在对他们的控制。这不仅需要内在的虔诚，还需要把物质世界改造为一个承认并促进人们精神发展的场所（《历史哲学》，第333页）。在黑格尔看来，满足这样的要求在他自己的时代才刚刚成为可能。基督教是在君士坦丁统治罗马时崭露头角的。然而，黑格尔声称，这是一个停滞的基督教分支，因为它试图在彻底腐败的制度上披上一层基督教的外衣（第336–341页）。中世纪的天主教会对人的精神发展也几乎没有推动，因为它把崇拜集中于“外在的”仪式和典礼，并坚持要求其信徒奴隶般地服从。因此，中世纪是一个“漫长、多事而可怕的夜晚”，只有文艺复兴——“那在长久风暴之后首次预示光明灿烂日子归来的朝霞”——和宗教改革——“那普照万物的太阳”——才结束了这一夜晚（《历史哲学》，第411–412页）。由日耳曼各民族（德意志、斯堪的纳维亚、不列颠、意大利和法兰西）领导的宗教改革，剥夺了天主教会的权力，并传播了每个个体都与基督有直接精神关系的观念。不需要任何外部权威来解释圣经、举行仪式和赐予救赎。在宗教改革中，个体良知成为真理的仲裁者，各地的人们都认识到“人在其本性上注定是自由的”（《历史哲学》，第417页）。

然而，将这一原则付诸实践并非易事，因为它要求个人和制度都接纳理性。黑格尔赞同康德的观点：当我们出于受社会制约的欲望而行动时，我们并不自由；自由只能在理性中找到。然而，黑格尔并不满意康德的伦理学理论，因为它没有详细说明我们应当做什么（《法哲学原理》，第二部分）。黑格尔坚信，自由只有在君主立宪制中才能完全实现。之所以需要君主，是因为必须在某处存在最终决定的权力。然而，如果立法机关（议会两院，上院由土地阶级组成，下院由工商阶级组成）和行政机关（凭功绩任命的文官）稳定且组织良好，那么君主往往只需签署自己的名字就行了。他同样坚信普选权行不通，因为那将等于人们按照自己的物质利益投票，甚至按照他们可能对某个候选人或另一个候选人形成的随心所欲的好恶来投票。在君主立宪制中，个人利益与共同体利益是和谐一致的（同上，第291–292节）。

《历史哲学》中自由展开的叙事体现了黑格尔辩证法的逻辑。在辩证法中，当我们探究一个理念（正题）时，我们会达到它的限度，并必然被引向对一个截然相反的理念（反题）的思考。随之而来的正题与反题之间的冲突导致对一个新理念即合题的思考，而这个合题反过来又可能被当作另一个辩证法三段式的正题。例如，在《历史哲学》中，希腊人的习俗道德构成了一个辩证运动的起点。这个“正题”的不充分性由苏格拉底揭示出来，他鼓励希腊人接受独立思想。习俗道德崩溃了，个体自由获胜。个体自由是习俗道德的“反题”。但这种自由过于抽象。因此我们可以看出，习俗道德和个体自由都过于片面。它们必须以保留各自优点的方式统一起来。黑格尔认为，他那个时代德国的君主立宪制就是一个“合题”，因为他认为共同体与个人处于和谐之中。即使黑格尔时代德国社会中的这个合题是《历史哲学》的终点，它也可能在其他方面被证明是片面的。在《历史哲学》导论中，黑格尔暗示美国（甚至可能还有澳大利亚）可能会看到自由的进一步展开（第81–91页）。世界历史继续前进，而当下则是一个生成中的状态。

黑格尔去世后，他的追随者分裂为老年黑格尔派和青年黑格尔派；从后者中，卡尔·马克思发展出一种社会和历史理论，吸收了许多黑格尔的概念。然而，马克思认为，是人们的物质生活，而非精神，决定着自由的展开。在法国，黑格尔主义塑造了萨特、拉康和科耶夫等作家的思想。在德国，黑格尔的理念被阿多诺、哈贝马斯和伽达默尔所接受。黑格尔的理念在十九世纪末的英国和美国也非常流行。然而，在世纪之交，黑格尔成为伯特兰·罗素和G. E. 摩尔等“分析”哲学家的主要攻击对象之一。G. R. G. 缪尔、F. H. 布拉德雷、威廉·华莱士、R. G. 柯林武德和T. M. 诺克斯试图重新唤起人们对黑格尔的兴趣，但未能扭转分析哲学潮流。在二十世纪的大部分时间里，英美对黑格尔的兴趣主要局限于他的社会和政治思想。然而在二十世纪六十年代，哲学家克劳斯·哈特曼发展出一种对黑格尔的新解释，在最近的黑格尔哲学兴趣复兴中发挥了重要作用。³ 如今有大量争论，涉及某些著作，如《精神现象学》，或者更具争议性地，他的全部著作，是否能够不依赖于精神理念以及形而上学中事物如何统一的理解而被理解。此外，自1989年以来，黑格尔学者一直围绕弗朗西斯·福山关于“历史终结”的各种论断进行争论。福山援引黑格尔，声称“历史”以自由民主制为顶点。然而，许多黑格尔学者迅速指出，福山的论证依赖于科耶夫颇有争议的《黑格尔哲学导论》。⁴ 他们认为，这种对科耶夫与黑格尔观念的混同，恰恰证明了阅读黑格尔的重要性。在近来将黑格尔之名用作各种历史研究路径简略代称的潮流中，这一点变得更加贴切；这些路径正是后现代、后结构、女性主义和后殖民历史学家力图拆解的。在这种框架下，黑格尔被视为一种男性中心主义、“欧洲中心”的主叙事或“元叙事”的鼻祖，这种叙事颂扬欧洲是现代文明的典范，并试图抹去或贬低其他文化的经验。例如，阿希斯·南迪、拉纳吉特·古哈和吉安·普拉卡什就反对生产“总体化”的黑格尔式历史书写，而主张“偶然的”和“非基础性的”微型叙事——小故事——和神话。⁵ 不幸的是，在某些情况下，仅仅援引黑格尔之名已经成为对其著作进行细致分析的替代品。此外，正如克温·李·克莱因不无讽刺地观察到的那样，有历史与无历史的人民之间的二律背反依然存在；唯一区别在于元叙事和微型叙事互换了位置，前者如今被认为“没有”历史。⁶ 一位黑格尔主义者或许会忍不住将此解读为“正题”被“反题”取代，并期待历史书写在未来接纳一个合题。

注释

黑格尔主要著作

• 《历史哲学讲演录》，J. Sibree译，纽约：多佛出版社，1956年。
• 《二十卷本黑格尔著作集》，20卷，E. Moldenhauer和K. M. Michel编，美因河畔法兰克福：苏尔坎普出版社，1969–71年。
• 《精神现象学》，A. V. Miller译，牛津：牛津大学出版社，1970年。
• 《哲学史讲演录：1825–26年讲演》，3卷，R. F. Brown编，R. F. Brown、J. M. Stewart和H. S. Harris译，伯克利与洛杉矶：加利福尼亚大学出版社，1990年。
• 《法哲学原理》，H. B. Nisbet译，A. Wood编，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1991年。
• 《逻辑学》，G. di Giovanni编，剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2010年。

另见

柯林武德、克罗齐、古哈、康德、麦克尼尔、马克思

进一步资源

• De Laurentiis, A., ‘Metaphysical Foundations of the History of Philosophy: Hegel’s 1820 Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy’, The Review of Metaphysics, 2005, 59(1): 3–32.
• Dudley, W. (ed.), Hegel and History, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009.
• Houlgate, S., Truth and History: an Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 1991.
• Pompa, L., Human Nature and Historical Knowledge: Hume, Hegel and Vico, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
• Wilkins, B. T., Hegel’s Philosophy of History, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.

英文原文

Philosophy is for Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ‘its own time raised to the level of thought’. This short statement conveys the central idea in Hegel’s writing: that the universals of philosophy and the particulars of history belong together, generating tensions that initiate new ideas and human experiences. Moreover, the open-ended nature of that relationship for Hegel explains why his works have been viewed in very different ways by different readers. Whereas some have dismissed him on the grounds that he shackled history to a Western view of philosophy, others have praised him for introducing a historical dimension into philosophy. Both groups of readers agree, however, that Hegel’s impact on nineteenth- and twentieth-century thought alone makes it important to understand what he has to say.

Hegel was born in Stuttgart on 27 August 1770. He studied theology at Tübingen, where he formed friendships with the poet Friedrich Hölderlin and the philosopher F. D. E. Schelling. After working as a tutor in Bern and Frankfurt, Hegel was a lecturer and then professor at the University of Jena. He completed his first work, System der Wissenschaft: Erster Theil, die Phänomenologie des Geistes, on the eve of Napoleon’s invasion of Jena (1807, trans. as The Phenomenology of Spirit). The occupation of Jena by Napoleon’s troops closed the university, and Hegel was forced to leave. He worked as an editor of a newspaper in Bamberg (1808) and then as the headmaster and philosophy teacher at a school in Nuremberg (1808–16). During this time he completed his Wissenschaft der Logik (1812–16, trans. as Science of Logic). In 1816 he took up a chair in philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, and then in 1818 was appointed to the prestigious chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin. While at Heidelberg he published the Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817, trans. partly as The Encyclopedia of Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Subjective Spirit). In Berlin Hegel expanded and revised the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, which he released under the title Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse – Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821, trans. as Elements of the Philosophy of Right). Up to his death from cholera in 1831 he continued to teach at Berlin, and published revised editions of the Encyclopedia (1827 and 1830). After his death a number of his lectures on the philosophy of history, history of philosophy, philosophy of religion, and aesthetics were published.

For Hegel, every historian, even the one who claims to let the ‘facts speak for themselves’, brings his categories with him and sees the data through them. In everything that is supposed to be scientific, Reason must be awake and reflection applied. (Lectures on the Philosophy of History, p. 11, hereafter Philosophy of History) Some categories are better than others, and historians who claim to be merely receptive are open to the danger of accepting poor ideas or falsehoods. In the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel details what he sees as the history of the search for more adequate categories in historical research. This history has three stages – original, critical and philosophical – which may be viewed as a hierarchy of forms. Each of the forms in the hierarchy embodies the idea of history, but the higher forms embody it more completely. Each form is the culmination of the idea of history at a particular point; that is, each is thought to represent the best embodiment of the idea of history until it is revealed as inadequate. When that inadequacy is exposed, historians are compelled to adopt a new idea of history.

According to Hegel, original historians ‘primarily [describe] the actions, events, and conditions which they [have] before their own eyes and whose spirit they [share]’ (Philosophy of History, pp. 1–3). Original histories thus describe contemporary or near-contemporary events from the point of view of the historian. Such a view of history, Hegel suggests, can be seen in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides. This view of history is no longer the dominant one because historians realise that their own views and those of the people they write about may not be in accord. Nor do historians restrict themselves to the description of recent events. The original view of history, Hegel tells us, gave way to a universal view. Universal historians offer surveys of the history of a people, a country or even the world. Two problems trouble them. First, they find it hard to justify the limitation of the scope of their works. That is, what grounds do historians have to justify limiting their accounts to a particular time, people or place? Second, they are troubled by the problem of doing justice to points of view other than their own. Are they capturing the spirit of other ages or merely using historical data to express their own views? In responding to these concerns, Hegel believes, universal historians usually end up writing pragmatic, critical or fragmentary histories. Critical historians restrict their research to the ideas that have given shape to past history-writing. Fragmentary historians are also interested in ideas, but they aim to go beyond the ‘accidental peculiarities of a people, merely external relations’ to the ‘internal guiding soul of events and actions’ (Philosophy of History, p. 8); that is, they try to identify what guides the history of a people. For Hegel, the histories of art, religion and law may afford clues to what guides the development of a people, but only philosophy, by being aware of its own methods and those of art, religion and law, can make the guiding force of history explicit.

Philosophical historians, Hegel tells us, realise that seemingly independent historical ideas and events are all part of the one reality that is ‘Mind/Spirit’, and that this Mind/Spirit is seeking unification and actualisation. Mind/Spirit is universal and cannot be identified with any particular person. Rather, each Mind/Spirit is a part of this World Mind/Spirit (Weltgeist) and the development of rationality in individuals contributes to the development of Mind. Hence reality emerges through rationality. To understand the development of reality – and ultimately themselves – philosophical historians must thus reason about the history of reason (Philosophy of History, p. 9). In Hegel’s opinion, the development of reason is most clearly seen in the development of freedom. Thus ‘the history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom’ (ibid., p. 19). With these words, Hegel signals a programme in which history is philosophy, and philosophy history, a programme that promises the reward of self-knowledge of ourselves as in a state of becoming free individuals in local and global communities.

In the main part of the Philosophy of History, Hegel aims to trace the unfolding of freedom in history. He begins with an account of the ‘Oriental World’, which covers the early civilisations of China, India and Persia. China and India are described as ‘stationary’ civilisations that are ‘outside the World’s History’ or ‘without History’, because they have ceased developing (p. 116). World History – as distinct from history, which refers to all events, not the development of freedom – only really begins with the Persian Empire (p. 173). What links these ‘oriental’ societies together is that law and morality are a matter of external regulation. According to Hegel, there is simply no sense in which ‘oriental’ individuals form their own moral judgements about right and wrong. This lack of individual morality takes different forms in the three societies surveyed, but they all produce the same result. In China, government is based on the paternal rule of the emperor, and all others see themselves as children of his state (pp. 116–38). The ruling power in India is not a human despot, but the despotism of a caste system that is viewed as natural and therefore unchangeable (pp. 139–66). Although on first sight the Persian emperor seems to be of the same ilk as the Chinese emperor, the basis of the Persian Empire can be found in a general principle or law which regulates the ruler as well as the subject. This, Hegel believes, was because Persia was a theocratic monarchy, based on the religion of Zoroaster. Although Persia was far from egalitarian, the fact that the general principle was not viewed as natural made development possible in principle. The idea of rule being based on a rationally devised principle signals the emergence of the consciousness of freedom (pp. 187–222). In its efforts to expand, the Persian Empire came into contact with Sparta and a number of the city-states of Greece. Drawing on Herodotus, Hegel notes that the eventual conflict between these groups was a contest between a despot who sought a world united under one leader, and the separate states who ruled by group decision.⁷ With the victory of the Greeks, the story of the unfolding of freedom passes to Greece (pp. 256–7).

Though the Greeks possessed freedom to a greater degree than the Persians, Hegel claims that their freedom was limited for two main reasons. First, Greek democracy required slavery in order to work, because participation in the public assembly left no time to attend to everyday chores. Thus some people, not all, were free. Second, the Greeks did not distinguish between their individual interests and the interests of those in their community. In Hegel’s view, because they acted from social convention they were still subject to external control. For example, genuinely free people would not allow their most important decisions to be determined by oracles: they would make their own decisions. Reason, Hegel contends, lifts people from external control and enables them to reflect critically upon their situation (pp. 258–68). The rise of critical reflection, Hegel contends, is seen in the philosophy of Socrates, who revealed that those who claimed to know the nature of, say, goodness or justice were simply parroting ideas that society had inculcated in them (pp. 269–70). Given the radical nature of Socrates’ ideas, Hegel is not surprised that he was put to death and that his ideas took root and were the ultimate cause of the downfall of Athens.

With the decline of Greek civilisation comes the rise of Roman civilisation. While the Greeks were united by ‘conventional morality’, the Romans, who were composed of a collection of diverse peoples, needed strict rules to keep themselves together. Though in Rome the idea of individual freedom did not disappear, it was ‘abstract’. I am free in the abstract sense if others do not interfere with what I want to do.⁸ In the Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that this is not a genuine form of freedom because it accepts the preferences of the individual in an uncritical manner. Many of these unquestioned preferences are simply echoes of society’s preferences. Thus, abstract freedom, for Hegel, is the freedom to be manipulated by others (Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §115). The real freedom that allows people to embrace a diversity of ideas and ways of living was brutally crushed by the Roman government. Faced with the state’s demands for outer conformity, individuals sought escape in Stoicism, Epicureanism and Scepticism. These movements aim to make their adherents indifferent to affairs in the world. Retreat into these philosophies, Hegel argues, is nothing more than escapism. For freedom to unfold further, he contends, a positive response was required (Philosophy of History, pp. 278–332).

Hegel believes that Christianity offered that positive response. In ‘religious self-consciousness’, humans recognise that the spiritual world is their true home. To achieve this consciousness, humans have to break the grip that material existence holds over them. This requires not just inner piety, but also the transformation of the material world into a place that acknowledges and fosters the spiritual development of people (Philosophy of History, p. 333). For Hegel, meeting such a requirement was only just possible in his own time. Christianity came to the fore when Constantine ruled Rome. Yet this was a stagnant branch of Christianity, Hegel claims, for it attempted to put a Christian veneer over institutions that were thoroughly corrupt (pp. 336–41). The Catholic church during the Middle Ages also did little to advance the spiritual development of man, because it focused worship on ‘external’ ceremonies and rituals and insisted on slavish obedience from its followers. The Middle Ages was thus a ‘long, eventful and terrible night’, which was only ended by the Renaissance, ‘that blush of dawn which after long storms first betokens the return of a bright and glorious day’, and the Reformation, ‘the all-enlightening Sun’ (Philosophy of History, pp. 411–12). The Reformation, which was led by the Germanic people (Germany, Scandinavia, Britain, Italy and France), stripped away the power of the Catholic church and spread the idea that each individual has a direct spiritual relationship with Christ. No outside authority is needed to interpret the scriptures, perform ceremonies and grant salvation. In the Reformation the individual conscience became the arbiter of truth, and people everywhere realised that ‘Man in his very nature is destined to be free’ (Philosophy of History, p. 417).

Putting this principle into practice is no easy matter, however, for it requires that individuals and institutions embrace rationality. Hegel agrees with Kant that we are not free when we act from socially conditioned desires, and that freedom is to be found in reason. Hegel is not satisfied with Kant’s ethical theory, however, because it does not detail what we ought to do (Elements of the Philosophy of Right, part 2). Hegel firmly believes that freedom can only be fully realised in a constitutional monarchy. A monarchy is needed because somewhere there must be the power of ultimate decision. If the legislature (two houses of parliament, the upper consisting of the landed class and the lower of the business class) and executive (civil servants, appointed on merit) are stable and well organised, however, the monarch often has nothing more to do than sign their name. He is just as firm in his belief that universal suffrage will not work because it would amount to people voting in accordance with their material interests, or even whimsical likes and dislikes they may form for one candidate or another. In a constitutional monarchy individual interests and the interests of the community are in harmony (ibid., §§291–2).

The unfolding story of freedom in the Philosophy of History embodies Hegel’s logic of the dialectic. In the dialectic, as we explore an idea (thesis) we arrive at its limits and are necessarily drawn to a consideration of a diametrically opposed idea (antithesis). The ensuing conflict between the thesis and antithesis leads to the contemplation of a new idea, or synthesis, which in turn may be taken as a thesis of another dialectical triad. For example, in The Philosophy of History, the customary morality of the Greeks forms the starting point of a dialectical movement. The inadequacy of this ‘thesis’ was demonstrated by Socrates, who encouraged the Greeks to embrace independent thought. Customary morality collapsed, and individual freedom triumphed. Individual freedom is the ‘antithesis’ of customary morality. But this freedom is too abstract. Thus we can see that customary morality and individual freedom are too one-sided. They must be united in a manner that preserves the strong points of each. Hegel believed that the constitutional monarchy in the Germany of his day was a ‘synthesis’ because he thought that the community and individual were in harmony. Even though the synthesis present in the German society of Hegel’s time is the end-point of the Philosophy of History, it may turn out to be one-sided in some other respect. In the introduction to the Philosophy of History, Hegel hints that America (and possibly even Australia) might see the further unfolding of freedom (pp. 81–91). World History continues, with the present as a state of becoming.

After Hegel’s death his followers divided into old and new factions; out of the latter, Karl Marx was to develop a theory of society and history that incorporated many Hegelian concepts. He argued, however, that it is the material life of people, not mind, that determines the unfolding of freedom. In France, Hegelianism gave shape to the thought of writers such as Sartre, Lacan and Kojève. In Germany, Hegelian ideas were taken up by Theodor Adorno, Jürgen Habermas and H.-G. Gadamer. Hegel’s ideas were also very popular in Great Britain and the United States towards the end of the nineteenth century. Around the turn of the century, however, Hegel became one of the main targets of attack for ‘analytic’ philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore. G. R. G. Mure, F. H. Bradley, William Wallace, R. G. Collingwood and T. M. Knox tried to revive interest in Hegel, but they could not turn the analytic tide. For most of the twentieth century, Anglo-American interest in Hegel was mostly limited to his social and political thought. In the 1960s, however, the philosopher Klaus Hartmann developed a new interpretation of Hegel that has played an important role in the recent revival of interest in his philosophy.⁹ There is now a great deal of debate on whether some works, such as the Phenomenology of Spirit, or, more controversially, all of his writings, can be understood independently of the idea of Mind/Spirit and the search for an understanding of how things fit together in metaphysics. In addition, since 1989, Hegel scholars have been engaged in a debate about Francis Fukuyama’s various pronouncements about ‘the end of History’. Drawing on Hegel, Fukuyama claimed that ‘History’ culminates with liberal democracy. A number of Hegel scholars, however, were quick to point out that Fukuyama’s argument depends upon Kojève’s contentious Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy.¹⁰ Such a conflation of Kojève’s and Hegel’s ideas, they argue, demonstrates the importance of reading Hegel. This point has become all the more pertinent in the recent trend of using Hegel’s name as a form of shorthand for approaches to history that postmodern, poststructural, feminist and postcolonial historians seek to dismantle. Framed thus, Hegel is seen as the progenitor of a masculinist, ‘Eurocentric’ master or ‘metanarrative’ that celebrates Europe as the epitome of a modern civilisation and seeks to erase or de-value the experiences of other cultures. Ashis Nandy, Ranajit Guha and Gyan Prakash, for example, have argued against the production of ‘totalising’ Hegelian historiographies and in favour of ‘contingent’ and ‘non-foundational’ micronarratives – small stories – and mythologies.¹¹ Unfortunately, in some cases the mere invocation of Hegel’s name has become a substitute for the careful analysis of his works. Further, as Kerwin Lee Klein has wryly observed, the antinomy between the peoples with and without history survives; the only difference is that metanarratives and micronarratives have swapped places, and the former is now held to be ‘without’ history.¹² A Hegelian might be tempted to read this as the replacement of a ‘thesis’ by an ‘antithesis’, and expect that historiography will embrace a synthesis in future.

Notes

Hegel’s major works

• Lectures on the Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, New York: Dover, 1956.
• Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 20 vols, eds E. Moldenhauer and K. M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969–71.
• The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.
• Lectures on the History of Philosophy: the Lectures of 1825–26, 3 vols, ed. R. F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown, J. M. Stewart and H. S. Harris, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990.
• Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
• Science of Logic, ed. G. di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

See also

Collingwood, Croce, Guha, Kant, McNeill, Marx

Further resources

• De Laurentiis, A., ‘Metaphysical Foundations of the History of Philosophy: Hegel’s 1820 Introduction to the Lectures on the History of Philosophy’, The Review of Metaphysics, 2005, 59(1): 3–32.
• Dudley, W. (ed.), Hegel and History, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2009.
• Houlgate, S., Truth and History: an Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy, New York: Routledge, 1991.
• Pompa, L., Human Nature and Historical Knowledge: Hume, Hegel and Vico, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
• Wilkins, B. T., Hegel’s Philosophy of History, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974.